



Appeal Decision

Hearing held on 21 November 2023

Site visit made on 20/21 November 2023

by Ben Plenty BSc (Hons) DipTP MRTPI

an Inspector appointed by the Secretary of State

Decision date: 8 December 2023

Appeal Ref: APP/H1705/W/23/3326959

Land at 1-9 Shyshack Lane, Baughurst, Tadley, RG26 5NH

- The appeal is made under section 78 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 against a refusal to grant planning permission.
 - The appeal is made by Riseley Heritage Holdings Ltd against the decision of Basingstoke and Deane Borough Council.
 - The application Ref 22/02905/FUL, dated 21 October 2022, was refused by notice dated 7 June 2023.
 - The development proposed is the erection of 3no. detached dwellings and associated access and parking.
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Decision

1. The appeal is dismissed.

Main Issue

2. The main issue is the effect of the proposed development on public safety, with particular regard to the Aldermaston Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) off-site emergency planning arrangements.

Reasons

3. The site comprises a large field to the rear of existing housing, with some parts extending towards Shyshack Lane. The proposal is to erect three dwellings to the rear of housing, creating a backland development within a residential area.
4. Policy SS7 of the Basingstoke and Deane Local Plan 2011-2029 [adopted 2016](LP) requires development in the land use planning consultation zones surrounding the AWE to be managed in the interests of public safety. The policy only permits development where the Off Site Nuclear Emergency Plan (OSEP) can accommodate the needs of the population in the event of an emergency. The policy states that consultation replies from the Office for Nuclear Regulation's (ONR) Directorate will be considered having regard to the following: (a) the proposed use, (b) the scale of development proposed, (c) the location of the development, and (d) the impact of the development on the functioning of the emergency plan through appropriate consultation with the multi agencies who have duties under the Radiation Emergency Preparedness and Public Information Regulations (REPPPIR).
5. The REPPPIR states that the OSEP should be designed to secure, so far as is reasonably practical, the restriction of exposure to ionising radiation and the health and safety of persons who might be affected by such reasonably foreseeable emergencies as identified in that assessment. The REPPPIR plan recommends sheltering within buildings during an event as the primary method

- of protection to human health. A building (with closed doors and windows) acting as a barrier would afford the greatest and most immediate and accessible type of protection in the event of the type described above. Measures for potential evacuation, are also advised either during or after the event, although this may not be necessary if the public is advised to shelter-in-place.
6. The proposal would introduce three additional dwellings around 468 metres from the AWE site boundary. The site is between Sectors K and L, which are densely populated sectors within the DEPZ, and are adjacent to other comparatively densely populated areas.
 7. West Berkshire Council (WBC) is required to produce an OSEP for a zone around the site that the regulations define as a Detailed Emergency Planning Zone (DEPZ), and for it to be able to implement this plan effectively. I am cognizant that the ONR has 'advised against' the development on the basis that there is uncertainty that the OSEP can accommodate further housing as it stands.
 8. ONR has advised that further development may have the potential to impact upon the adequate implementation of the OSEP. It has arrived at this view following assessment of evidence collected through its regulatory oversight under REPPiR, modular exercises, a live test and wider engagements with WBC. The live test confirmed shortfalls that were identified through the previous exercises and suggests uncertainty that a population increase can be accommodated by the OSEP as it stands. I understand that the ONR's position predates the current appeal scheme as in August 2021 it contacted the affected local councils expressing this concern.
 9. The objection of the ONR is consistent with the position expressed by WBC. WBC's Emergency Planning Officer has been unable to give assurance that the additional households proposed could be accommodated within the existing OSEP. It has explained that the AWE area presents a complex situation in the event of an emergency event and the OSEP is at a "cliff edge" when considering its ability to accommodate additional households.
 10. WBC identifies that the proposed scheme would result in an increase of total dwellings within the DEPZ to 7321 dwellings, and a population increase of around 7 residents. Although such an increase would be comparatively small, it is recognised that the plan is not infinitely scaleable. An increase in population would increase the need for, and demand placed upon, emergency responders, reception centres, rest centres and radiation monitoring exacerbating the difficulties of delivery emergency care in a complex multi-agency emergency. Given the specific area of expertise of the WBC's Emergency Planning function, its concern with respect to the deliverability of the OSEP carries considerable weight.
 11. Although relatively small-scale, the proposal would increase demand on the resources available to implement the OSEP in the event of a radiation emergency. This demand would be above the needs of existing people requiring assistance in the event of an evacuation and would put increased pressure on rest centres. Furthermore, increased demand would increase the requirement for any long-term accommodation required for evacuated members of the public. Therefore, placing people in an area where there is a known risk would contribute to the complicated response required from

- emergency services. Increased demand on services, at such a time, could jeopardise the effectiveness of the plan as a whole in contradiction of the objective of policy SS7.
12. The suggestion that individual development could be justified on the basis that it alone would be small in scale and have a negligible, if any, effect on the preparation and delivery of the OSEP is an argument that could be easily repeated. This approach would result in incremental development that would over time significantly erode the effective management of the land use planning consultation zones surrounding the AWE to the disbenefit of public safety. The proposed development would place a greater burden on the OSEP, which is already under pressure based on the comments of the ONR.
 13. The National Risk Register [2023] identifies that the risk of a radiation emergency at a Civil Nuclear Site is less than 0.2%, but if an emergency were occur, the impact would be 'catastrophic'. Although the Aldermaston AWE is not a Civil Nuclear Site, the evidence suggests that the identified likelihood and impact would be similar. As stated by WBC's Emergency Planners, the likelihood of an incident remains credible and would have an adversely high impact on the public. I concur with this view and, even if unlikely to occur, such an emergency would require extensive resources and create significant effects in the local area.
 14. Dr Pearce explained that radiation causes an ionisation of chemicals in the body, causing injury and cancer, with millisieverts (mSv) being a measure of the harm to an organism. His evidence states that daily background levels are around 1.3 mSv, increasing to 7.8 mSv in Cornwall¹ due to the predominance of granite which releases radon. The REPIR explains, at appendix 2, that doses in the range of 1-10 mSv as "minor" with minimal health and safety effects. If an incident were to occur at the AWE, a person at the appeal site might be exposed to a radiation dose of 7.5 mSv, in shelter this would be reduced by around 3 mSv. Accordingly, Dr Pearce was content that even if a major incident were to occur the effects would be within the range commonly experienced by members of the public in everyday life.
 15. Consequently, the chance of a release of radioactive material is low and if it were to happen the level of exposure would also be low. However, whilst comforting, this does not take into account the key purpose of the REPIR to reduce exposure during a radiation emergency through the effective deployment of the OSEP. Furthermore, it is noted that ONR identifies that "there must be robust emergency preparedness and response arrangements in place for radiological emergencies, however unlikely they may be"².
 16. Also, these points do not account for the effect of an emergency event to the emergency services and the local population. The demands on emergency resources would be substantial creating short term and possibly long-term efforts to effectively manage such an emergency. This would need to take into account social, economic and environmental affects, that could require the local environment and community many years to fully recover. Furthermore, the anticipated low emission and exposure effects of any release would not diminish the statutory requirement for a robust OSEP to be in place, or the

¹ Appeal Statement by Dr Pearce, para 70

² Office for Nuclear Regulation, Statement, para 64

need for such a plan to be of sufficient rigor to ensure it can be delivered effectively in the interests of protecting public safety.

17. Accordingly, I find that the proposal would adversely impact on the functioning of the OSEP contrary to the interests of public safety. Hence, it would conflict with LP policy SS7 and paragraph 97 of the National Planning Policy Framework (the Framework) which, among other matters, states that planning decisions should promote public safety and take into account wider security and defence requirements.

Other Matters

18. The Appellant asserts that the size and shape of the DEPZ is arbitrary, and the OSEP could be more effectively delivered if a smaller population was affected by its measures. The Council has informed that boundary lines were decided taking into consideration community boundaries to assist in evacuation and sheltering strategies. The size of the DEPZ is dictated by legislation and it is for the responsible authority to adjust this if required by taking into account local geographic, demographic and practical implementation issues. Moreover, the definition of the area of the DEPZ is not straight forward and its conception includes an extensive consultation process, involving a range of specialist stakeholders. It is reviewed every three years, and this review process presents an appropriate forum to make any required adjustments. Therefore, it is not the place of this appeal to interrogate the size or shape of the DEPZ.
19. An appeal was allowed, in November 2022, for 49 houses within the DEPZ of Burghfield AWE at Kingfisher Grove. I have limited details of this scheme, but I have noted from the Decision Letter that the scheme was for affordable dwellings and was within the jurisdiction of Wokingham Borough Council. Also, the site was a substantially greater distance from the AWE, at around 2.8 kilometres. As such, this was subject to different policies and had different characteristics to the scheme proposed in this appeal. For these reasons, whilst each case must be considered on its own merits, the appeal decision at Kingfisher Grove describes a scheme with bespoke circumstances that cannot be readily applied elsewhere.
20. The Council has also submitted a range of planning appeals that have been dismissed for open market dwellings where siting within the DEPZ have been factors in their dismissal. As such, these are of greater relevance to the proposal before me and attract more weight. My approach is broadly consistent with those decisions.
21. The Council cannot demonstrate it has a 5-year Housing Land Supply, as identified in the Council's Authority Monitoring Report [2023] demonstrating it has a supply of 4.7 years. This figure has been subsequently reduced by the Council following an appeal decision, where the Inspector found a supply of 4.1 years. This was further reviewed by the Council to 4.2 years given the release of more recent affordability data.
22. Based on the evidence submitted I see no reason to disagree with this position. Where a local planning authority is unable to demonstrate a 5-year supply of deliverable housing sites, footnote 8 of paragraph 11 of the Framework, indicates that relevant policies for the supply of housing should not be considered up-to-date. Paragraph 11 of the Framework explains that where relevant policies are out-of-date permission should be granted, unless any

adverse impacts of doing so would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits when assessed against the policies in the Framework taken as a whole.

Planning Balance and Conclusion

23. The Framework seeks to boost the supply of housing and highlights the important contribution small sites can make. The proposal would deliver three family houses, making a modest contribution to the housing needs of the district. These could be delivered relatively quickly, making a rapid positive contribution to the local supply of housing in the settlement. The appeal site is within the defined settlement of Baughurst and has good access to goods and services. There would be some economic benefits during the construction phase when the development would provide jobs and opportunities for local companies and once occupied when future residents support services in Baughurst and the surrounding area. The proposal would introduce new planting that would provide enhanced biodiversity benefits. These benefits are of modest weight in favour of the proposal.
24. Weighed against these benefits is the issue that the appeal scheme would not comply with the Council's policy with respect to development close to nuclear installations. The weight to be given to this conflict should be reduced by the Council's inability to demonstrate it has a 5-year supply of deliverable housing sites, although three new houses would only make a limited contribution to the district's housing supply.
25. Nonetheless, the proposal has failed to demonstrate that the OSEP can accommodate the proposal without compromising the needs of the existing and extended population within the DEPZ. The additional burden would place pressure on the delivery of the Emergency Plan within a site which is close to the centre of the DEPZ and in an area that is densely populated. The additional demand for emergency services, at the time of an incident, would exacerbate an Emergency Plan already under tension resulting in substantial threat to its delivery affecting the safety of the public. This conflict accords with the objectives of the Framework for planning decisions to promote public safety and take into account wider security and defence requirements by, among other matters, proportionate steps to increase resilience and ensure public safety and security.
26. Therefore, the adverse impact of the development on the delivery of an effective OSEP would significantly and demonstrably outweigh the benefits, when assessed against the policies in the Framework taken as a whole and therefore the presumption in favour of sustainable development does not apply.
27. For the reasons given above, the proposal would conflict with the development plan as a whole and there are no material considerations, including the Framework, that would outweigh that conflict. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.

Ben Plenty

INSPECTOR

APPEARANCES

For the Appellant:

Mr Neil Davis - Planning Consultant
Dr Keith Pearce - Principal Consultant, Katmal Limited

For the Council:

Miss Bethan Wallington - Senior Planning Officer, Basingstoke and Dean Council
Mr Stuart Fox - Head of Emergency Planning, Hampshire County Council
Mrs Carolyn Richardson - Emergency Planning, West Berkshire Council
Mr Eamonn Guilfoyle - Office for Nuclear Regulation
Mr Sean Bashforth - Planning Consultant, Quod, acting for the MOD and Aldermaston AWE

Interested parties:

Ms Jacky Berry - Resident
Mr Ian Jackson - Resident

Additional documents

Doc A: Council's suggested additional condition